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THE CREDENTIALS APPROACH TO
REPRESENTATION QUESTIONS IN THE
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
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On November 12, 1974, the President of the General Assembly,
Algerian representative Abdelaziz Bouteflika, ruled that the South
African delegation to the General Assembly could not continue to
participate in the work of the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Assembly
because the delegation's credentials had not been accepted by the
Assembly. "On the basis of the consistency with which the General
Assembly has regularly refused to accept the credentials of the delegation of South Africa," Bouteflika said,
[O]ne may legitimately infer that the General Assembly
would in the same way reject the credentials of any other
delegation authorized by the Government of the Republic of

South Africa to represent it, which is tantamount to saying in
explicit terms that the General Assembly refuses to allow the

delegation of South Africa to participate in its work.'
The President's ruling was challenged by the United States representative, but was upheld by the General Assembly with ninety-one votes
2
for, twenty-two against and nineteen abstentions.
The decision effectively barred South Africa from exercising any
membership rights. This action was taken by the General Assembly,
* Assistant Professor of International Relations, Florida International University, Miami, Florida. The author wishes to express thanks to Professor Alfred P. Rubin
of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Massachusetts, for his valuable
comments on an earlier draft of this article. The opinions expressed herein remain solely
the author's.
I. The text of the ruling is given in Resolutions of Legal Interest Adopted by the
General Assembly at its Sixth Special Session and Twenty-Ninth Regular Session; The
ruling is referred to, but not reproduced, in Resolutions Adopted by the GeneralAssembly at Its Twenty-Ninth Session, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 10-11, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974).
The Twenty-Fifth Session was the first at which South African credentials were not
accepted. Prior to that time, the General Assembly had decided, at its Twentieth
Session, "to take no action on the credentials submitted on behalf of the representatives
of South Africa." 20 U.N. GAOR (1407th plen. mtg.) 10, 16, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1407
(1965). Regarding the distinction drawn by the General Assembly between "rejection"
of credentials and taking "no action", see note 36 infra.
2. 29 U.N. GAOR (2281st plen.mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/PV.2281 (1974).
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and therefore, applied solely to that organ.3 However, South Africa is
not a permanent member of the Security Council, and since it elected
not to place Southwest Africa under the United Nations trusteeship
system, it is not represented as an administering power on the Trusteeship Council. All other organs in the United Nations derive their
membership through election by the General Assembly. South Africa,
which has not sent a delegation to the United Nations since the
Assembly's Twenty-Ninth Session, is unlikely to be elected to any of
these organs.
The General Assembly's action was taken after approval and
adoption of the first report of the Credentials Committee. 5 The Committee accepted all the credentials submitted to it, "with the exception
6
of the credentials of the representatives of South Africa."
By taking this action, the Assembly went beyond any former
action taken by it during previous sessions pertaining to the same
question. The Hambro formula, first given expression by the eminent
Norwegian jurist, Edvard Hambro, who presided over the General
Assembly's Twenty-Fifth Session, had represented the boldest action
taken by the Assembly before its Twenty-Ninth Session. Under that
formula the South African delegation continued to participate in the
3. The action by the Twenty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly does not bind
future assemblies which will examine credentials de novo each year. Rule 27 of the
Assembly's Rules of Procedure requires that credentials of representatives be submitted
to the Secretary-General "if possible not less than one week before the opening of the
session." Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.12, at 6
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Rules of Procedure]. Hereinafter, all citations to id. shall be
to the United Nations document number.
4. See Report of the Credentials Committee to the Seventh Special Session, 7
U.N. GAOR Special Session, S-VII Annexes (Agenda Item 3) 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/10228
(1975); and G.A. Res. 3367 (XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 2, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1975).
5. G.A. Res. 3206, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 2, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Every year the credentials of many delegations are neither received in time nor are they
in the proper form. Rule 27 of the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure states that
credentials should be "issued either by the Head of the State or Government or by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs." In the initial years of the United Nations, the Credentials
Committee of the General Assembly met twice to review the credentials as they were
received. A report was presented to the General Assembly after each group had been
reviewed. This practice was abandoned during the Eleventh Session, when the Credentials Committee started meeting only once, at the end of the session. This made the work
of the Credentials Committee redundant because there was never time to act on the
report apart from adopting it. At its Twenty-Ninth Session, however, the Credentials
Committee was urged to meet early. It should be noted that the League also faced the
problem of improper credentials and a subcommittee of the First Committee of the
League Assembly was appointed to look into the matter. The report of the First
Committee is in Documents of the I 5th Ordinary Session of the League of Nations, 15
League Doc. A/47/1934N (1934).
6. 29 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 3) 2, U.N. Doc. A/9779 (1974).
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working of the Assembly, although the rejection of its credentials was
looked upon as "a very strong condemnation of South Africa," and "a
warning to that Government as solemn as any such warning could
be." ' 7 The precedent set by the Hambro formula was followed by the
General Assembly up through its Twenty-Eighth Session. However,
that formula, neither in practice nor in theory, represented the limits of
the General Assembly action on the question.
The forced cessation of the South African delegation's participation in the General Assembly went beyond the Hambro formula and
has raised questions regarding the legality of the Assembly's action.
This article will attempt to clarify some of the issues in this controversy and to bring into focus the fact that representation in the General
Assembly, which hitherto has been treated as a question of credentials, is really quite a different matter. This article also takes the
position that "rules" regarding representation, if any do indeed exist,
involve political decisions by member states; and that under certain
conditions, quite different from suspension, the General Assembly's
Rules of Procedure provide for the expulsion of delegates-an action
that could be tantamount to a forced cessation of participation.
I.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CREDENTIALS AND REPRESENTATION

The United Nations Charter and its Rules of Procedure, the chief
instruments under which the General Assembly functions, refer broadly to two aspects of states' participation in that organ: membership and
credentials. Chapter II of the Charter, comprising articles 3 through 6,
defines the principles of membership, suspension, and expulsion of
states. Chapter XIV of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, comprising
rules 134 through 138, deals with the admission of new members to the
United Nations. 8 The Charter is silent on matters of credentials and
their requirements, which are elaborated in rules 27 through 29 of the
9
Assembly's Rules of Procedure.
The exigencies of international life have highlighted a third aspect
of states' participation in United Nations organs and in other international organizations. This aspect, representation, has been overlooked
or possibly ignored by both the Charter and the Rules of Procedure of
the General Assembly.
The question of deciding which of two or more competing authorities will be treated as the authoritative and legitimate agent of the
7. 25 U.N. GAOR (1901st plen. mtg.) 25, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1901 (1970).
8. Rules of Procedure, supra note 3, at 30-31.
9. Id.at 6-7.
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state in its international dealings is a problem that has arisen several
times in the last thirty years for states and for international organizations alike. A parallel problem that has arisen occasionally occurs
when only one claimant exists. The question then posed is whether that
claimant can be considered as the agent of the state in international
relations. It appears that both these situations, the single claimant and
the multiclaimant, derive their solution from similar principles.
When states are confronted with such questions, they make the
necessary determinations of representativeness-constatations. Then,
further decisions of whether or not to act are made on the basis of these
determinations." Most of the standard texts on international law will
note the well established rules required by law to aid states in their
constatations and decisions. II
Nevertheless, the United Nations Charter and the Assembly's
Rules of Procedure make no provisions for the revolutionary change of
the government of a state which is a fairly common occurrence in
international life. One writer has stated that, "All governments owe
their origin to a revolutionary event in a more or less distant past
. . ,1"2 Although the Charter is silent on this contingency and, in
this sense, has a "gap", it cannot ignore such developments. The
United Nations, being not only an important part of the international
diplomatic scene, but also being composed of sovereign equal member-states, and being an arena where legal and political battles are
waged, should develop procedures and rules to deal with this "gap"
13
within its constitutional framework.
10. Professor Leo Gross has shed much light on such two-stage processes in the
related area of membership in the United Nations. See, Gross, Progress Towards
Universality of Membership in the United Nations, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 791, 824 (1956).
II. See generally, I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 125-52 (8th ed. 1966);
Mugerwa, .Subjects of International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
266-90 (especially 283-84) (M. Sorensened. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Mugerwal.
12. R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 149 (1963) [hereinafter cited as HIGGINS].
13. This statement may dismay those scholars who have found themselves uncomfortable with the "effectivity" concept and corresponding interpretations of the Charter.
Without delving into the merits of that concept and the corresponding "Charter-as-amultilateral-treaty" versus the "Charter-as-a-constituent instrument" controversy, it is
suggested that the United Nations can function as a viable organization as long as it does
not invite neglect by lagging too far behind "world opinion". The composition of the
United Nations must reflect the realities of the international arena, and it is in this light
that the suggestion of developing procedures to deal adequately with representation
questions-must be viewed. The 1975 Vienna "Convention on the Representation of
States in Their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character"
does not deal with the questions of representation which have been raised in this paper
and which have frequently arisen in the practice of international organizations. For the
text of the Convention, see 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 730 (1975).
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The Chinese question, which was raised at the General Assembly's Fifth Session in 1950, exposed this shortcoming within the
constitutional framework of the United Nations. 14 Cuban and British
proposals were submitted which acknowledged the existence of this
lacuna and suggested criteria which might be adopted when questions
regarding representation were raised.15
An amendment of the Charter would be an ideal way to close the
"gap", but, given the existing political configuration within the
United Nations and the veto power over amendments possessed by the
permanent members of the Security Council under articles 108 and
109(2) of the Charter, such an event is unlikely to occur. 16 Alternatively, the gap could be closed presumably through an appropriate
addition to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure.
In practice, however, a third solution has been utilized. Existing
rules have been stretched to cover situations for which they were not
designed. The Assembly's rules pertaining to credentials, which are
rules 27 through 29 of the Rules of Procedure, have been used to deal
with questions of representation arising from revolutionary changes of
government or from other challenges. In other words, the General
Assembly's Rules of Procedure on credentials questions have been
stretched to apply to questions relating to representation as well.
Nkambo Mugerwa correctly has observed that,
[w]hen representation of a member state is in issue and more
than one authority claims the right to represent it, the problem is treated as a matter of credentials under the rules of
procedure of the various organs of the United Nations.17
14. The question was raised earlier in the Security Council when the Indian delegate drew attention to a "lacuna" in the law of the United Nations and proposed
amendments to the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure because "[n]one of the
rules indicates what is to be done when any question arises as to which is the recognized
Government of any particular State." For the proposals, see 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.May 1950) 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/1447 (1950). After referring the matter to a committee of
experts, the Council concluded that the question of representation in United Nations
organs should be studied by the General Assembly. 5 U.N. SCOR 468th mtg.) 9-11
(1950).
15. The Cuban Draft Resolution is contained in 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda
Item 61) 5, U.N. Doc. A/1308 (1950). The United Kingdom draft resolutions are contained in id. at 6, U.D. Doc. A/AC.38/L.21 (1950) and id. at 8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
38/L.21/Rev. 1 (1950).
16. The only amendments to the Charter in the thirty-year history of the United
Nations have been those increasing the memberships of the Security Council and the
Economic and Social Council in order to make them geographically representative.
Appropriate changes in related articles, such as those dealing with voting rules, rotation
of the Council memberships, and article 109(3) have also been effected.
17. Mugerwa, supra note 11, at 283. This development has had a noteworthy effect
on the composition of the Credentials Committee. Since 1950, the year the Chinese case
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Yet, the distinction between credentials and representation is real and
must not be ignored. Rosalyn Higgins cautions us to "distinguish
between disputes over credentials which are really disputes over for...
18 However, she
mality, and those disputes which go farther.
to maintain." 19
hard
been
has
distinction
this
practice
"in
notes that
Member states have not been oblivious to the distinction between
credentials and representation. British representative, Sir Pierson Dixon, shrewdly drew this distinction to his country's advantage when he
told the Second Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly:
My Government recognizes the Government of the People's
Republic of China as the Government of China, and my
delegation feels that we should place it on record that we
voted in favour of the adoption of the Credentials Committee's report [accepting the Nationalist Chinese credentials]
solely on the grounds that the credentials concerned, considered as a document, were in order. We reserve our position on the right of the Chinese Nationalist authorities to
issue a document appointing representatives in the name of
China .20
The Cubans, in a clear and forthright letter to the Secretary-General,
stated that the "distinction between credentials and representation is an
undeniable legal and political reality." 21
To summarize, credentials are normally considered as documents
that emanate from a legitimate government for the purpose of clarifying the status of a given delegate. On the other hand, representation is
concerned with the question of whether a governmental authority will
be considered generally as the international agent of the state and, for
the present discussion, as the representative of that state in the General
Assembly. The chain of legal connection has three links that go from
the state through the government to the delegate. That is, the government represents the member state and also appoints the delegate.
The 1950 Cuban memorandum on representation correctly stated
that the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure "are based on the
presumption that in each Member State represented on the organ there
exists a definite government competent to appoint representatives and
appeared on the scene, both the United States and Soviet Union have been on every
Credentials Committee except one appointed at the General Assembly's Sixth Session.
During the first four sessions they were represented only on the Fourth Session.
18. HIGGINS, supra note 12, at 151.
19. Id.
20. GAOR, 2nd Emergency Special Session, 571 Plenary Meeting, p. 81, para. 261
(emphasis added).
21. 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 3, U.N. Doc. A/1308 (1950).
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issues their credentials." 22 Under this presumption, the second step in
the legal connection chain mentioned above is usually taken for granted. This was also Kelsen's opinion; he said, "[a]pproval of the credentials of a representative by the General Assembly . . . necessarily
implies that the General Assembly . . . considers the government

which issued the credentials as the legitimate government of the
23
Member State to be represented in the Assembly. ",
It may be mentioned that in the only case of this type encountered
by the League Assembly, the Credentials Committee was allowed to
handle the question. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia raised the
question of "whether the head of the [Abyssinian] state from whom
the credentials under examination emanate was exercising his legal
title effectively enough to make those credentials perfectly in
order. . . "24
Thus, the Credentials Committee of the League Assembly treated the
question as one of representation and, like Kelsen, examined the
25
authority which stood behind the credentials.
United Nations experience in this area has been significantly
wider than that of the League, and the credentials of several delegations have been challenged over its thirty-odd years. While "Member
States [have] changed their legal position from one session to
another," and have even adopted conflicting positions "in one and the
same meeting of the Credentials Committee or the General Assembly, "26 it remains true that most United Nations member states have
looked beyond the facade of credentials to the legitimacy of the
authority issuing them. For example, at the Assembly's Twelfth Session, the Dutch delegate found that the Hungarian delegation could not
22. Id.
23. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 947 n.4 (1964).
24. Assembly Documents for the 17th Session, 17 League Doc. A/41 (1936), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 545 (S. Heald ed. 1935). The committee found the Abyssinian credentials "sufficient to permit that delegation to sit at the
present session." Id. See also, Lauterpacht, The Credentials of the Abyssinian Delegation to the Seventeenth Assembly of the League of Nations, 18 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 18486 (1937).
25. While no one on the committee suggested an outright rejection of the credentials issued by Emperor Haile Selassie, "all the members of the Committee felt some
doubt whether they really were in order." After rejecting the idea of referring the
question to the Permanent Court on grounds that the opinion would come too late to
affect proceedings at that session of the Assembly, the committee recommended that the
Assembly consider the Abyssinian credentials "despite the doubt as to their regularity,
as sufficient to permit that delegation to sit at the present session." DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 24, at 546.
26. Ciobanu, Credentials of Delegations and Representation of Member States at
the U.N., 25 INT'L L. & COMP. L. Q. 351, 367 (1976).
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"be regarded as representative of that country." '2 7 While the British
expressed "misgivings regarding the representative character of the
Hungarian authorities," 2 8 the United States delegate, Mr. Lodge,
found it clear that "the present Hungarian authorities [were] not
capable of representing the freedom-loving people of Hungary in the
United Nations. .".." In addition, the Soviet Union challenged the
credentials of the Nationalist Chinese, stating that they were "private
persons who style themselves representatives of the Republic of China
and claim to represent China in the [United Nations] when, in fact,
3
they represent no one.' '
The practice of investigating into the legitimacy of challenged
governments was taken a step further in the Congo case. By resolution
1480 (XV), adopted on September 20, 1960, 3 1 the General Assembly
admitted the Republic of the Congo, Leopoldville, to United Nations
membership. However, faced with an unclear political and constitutional situation, the Assembly referred the question of Congolese
representation to the Credentials Committee.3 2 The Committee met
November 9, 1960, and recommended that the credentials of the
Kasavubu delegation be accepted. In the debate over the Credentials
Committee's report, several delegations quoted and interpreted provisions of the Congolese Loi Fondamentale to "prove" that one faction
or another in the domestic power struggle was the legitimate authority
to issue credentials. 3 3 It is clear then, that when questions concerning
representation arise in the General Assembly, the lack of specific
representation rules has been dealt with by using the rules pertaining to
credentials.
However, there is another reason why rules regarding credentials
have been utilized in cases where representation has been questioned.
In order to challenge the representation of a governmental authority in
the General Assembly, particularly one already seated there, one can
either present the question at the annual review of credentials or raise
the issue under a specific agenda item. The former has the obvious
advantage of providing the objector with a ready-made forum. This is
why Professor Briggs concludes that "[a]lthough there may be
27. 12 U.N. GAOR (726th plen. mtg.) 565, U.N. Doc. A/PV.726 (1957).
28. U.N. Doc. A/3773 at I (1957).
29. 13 U.N. GAOR (792d plen. mtg.) 609, U.N. Doc. A/PV.792 (1958).
30. Id. at 610.
31. GA Res. 1480 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 64, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
32. 15(l) U.N. GAOR (864th plen. mtg.) 6, U.N. Doc. A/PV.864 (1960).
33. See 15(l) U.N. GAOR (917th-924th plen, mtgs.) 871-980, U.N. Doc. A/PV91724 (1960).
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grounds for distinguishing a decision on representation from one on
credentials, procedurally the vote can only be on credentials-unless
the organ wishes to incur the charge of interfering in the internal affairs
of a Member State." 34 Thus, it is easier under the existing United
Nations rules to challenge the representation of a delegation by denying its credentials.
Although this approach to representation questions has been
utilized in several cases, it leaves much to be desired.35 Procedurally it
is confusing to use the same set of rules to tackle the distinct, albeit
related, questions of credentials and representation. The General Assembly's practice in these matters has not helped; it has taken three
distinct actions on credentials: approval, no action, and rejection. In
all cases, including those cases where credentials have been rejected,
the delegates whose credentials are in question have participated fully
in, the deliberations of the General Assembly. 36 One delegate, on
whose credentials the General Assembly had decided to take "no
action", was even elected as rapporteur of the Assembly's First Committee for the Seventeenth Session.3 7 Moreover, when one compares
the scant importance that the General Assembly has attached to credentials, by accepting them late and in improper forms, with the bitter
debates over representation issues; one logically may conclude that
34. Briggs, Chinese Representation in the United Nations, 6 INT'L ORGAN. 192, 208
(1952). This view is substantiated by the experience of the Chinese case, where the
question was annually raised in the Credentials Committees and in the plenary when
discussing Credentials Committee reports. Attempts to change the representation of
China in the Assembly were defeated each year. For instance, see the annual reports of
the Secretary-General since 1950 under the heading "The Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations." This explains why the fight on representation was
waged in the Credentials Committee.
It may be noted, however, that dealing with representation questions in the credentials forum has not precluded charges of interference in the internal affairs of a state. For
instance, see the Hungarian delegate's statement to that effect in 12 U.N. GAOR (726th
plen. mtg.) 561, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 276 (1957).
35. The credentials approach to representation questions in the United Nations
General Assembly has been used in the Chinese, Hungarian, Congolese, Yemenite,
Iraqi, and South African cases. For the League experience, see Lauterpacht, supra note
24. There is one detailed account of the Chinese case. See, Liang, Notes on Legal
Questions Concerning the United Nations, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 689 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as Liang]. Since the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly, some Arab
member states have registered objections to the credentials of the delegation from Israel.
6 U.N. GAOR, Special Session, (2228th plen. mtg.) 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/PV 2228 (1974).
36. It can be persuasively argued that because credentials are to be submitted each
year and because credentials are the instruments which legitimize an individual's status
as delegate, they, in effect, should be accepted each year. In such a situation, it is
suggested that a "no action" decision should be tantamount to a rejection of credentials.
37. The Hungarian delegate, Kfroly Csatorday, served as rapporteur of The First
Committee. 17 U.N. GAOR (1245th plen. mtg.) 21, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1245 (1%2).
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actions taken on credentials are of a different type than those taken on
representation.
II.

METHODS OF RESOLVING QUESTIONS CONCERNING
REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Several attempts have been made to bring a semblance of order to
this chaotic area. While no attempt has achieved widespread acceptance, three merit particular notice. The first is Secretary-General
Trygve Lie's famous memorandum on "The Legal Aspects of the
Problem of Representation in the United Nations."- 38 The second is
General Assembly Resolution 396 (V) on the "Recognition by the
United Nations of the Representation of a Member State." 39 The third,
two decades later, is the Legal Counsel's statement on the "Scope of
'Credentials' in Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure of the General
Assembly. -40
A.

The Secretary-General's Memorandum on "The Legal Aspects
of the Problem of Representation in the United Nations"

Soon after the 1949 communist take-over in China, SecretaryGeneral Trygve Lie ordered a memorandum on representation prepared by the Secretariat and had it circulated privately to Security
Council members. The memorandum 4' sought to establish some
criteria on representation. It made a distinction between recognition of
a state or government by another government and representation within
a multinational organization. The memorandum found these to be twodistinct legal acts, performed by entirely different international "persons" which do not share the same international personality. 42 Furthermore, it can be argued forcefully, that international organizations do
not have the legal authority to accord recognition to a state or government. Such "collective recognition" would replace individual recognition by states, which is something that states have not accepted as
yet. Thus, for purposes of the present discussion, the conceptual
distinction between recognition and representation shall be accepted as
settled.
38. 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-May I, 1950) 18-22, U.N. Doc. S/1466 (1950).
39. 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 24-25, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
40. 25 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 3)3-4, U.N. Doc. A/8160 (1970). Other
attempts to bring some order to the problem of representation can be found in Liang,
supra note 35, at 689-707, and HIGGINS, supra note 12, at 146-52.
41. 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-May 1950) 18-22, U.N. Doc. S/1466 (1950).
42. The International Court found in the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations case that the United Nations was an "international
person." [1949] I.C.J. 174, 179. However, the Court went on to add, "that is not the
same thing as saying that [the United Nations] is a State, which it certainly is not, or that
its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State," Id.
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However, the Secretary-General's memorandum does seek to
show that in both legal theory and practice it is "legally inadmissible
to condition the latter acts [of admission or representation in the United
Nations] by a requirement that they be preceded by individual recognition." 4 3 It argues that while recognition represents the individual
political decision of a state, representation is the collective decision of
an organ within an international organization. It is therefore legally
inadmissible to premise the collective act upon several individual acts.
"Rules" regarding criteria for representation are uncertain at
best, because neither the Charter nor the several rules of procedure for
the various organs of the United Nations expressly states what criteria
shall be employed for determining questions or representation. The
United Nations Preparatory Commission ignored a warning from the
Cuban delegate that the Credentials Committee "might easily find
itself involved in political complications. ' ' 44 The issue went unresolved, and the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Political Committee
and a special committee appointed in 1950 were forced to consider the
issue in the initial stages of the Chinese representation question. The
various views stated at the time, including resolution 396 (V), make it
clear that there was no set of rules on representation that could be
identified as "generally acceptable'

.

It is conceivable that a rule similar to the type proposed by the
Secretary-General's memorandum, which precludes prior individual
recognition as a criterion for representation in the United Nations,
could develop. However, it is clear, that this cannot be asserted upon
the same grounds as the memorandum, which is merely upon the fact
that recognition is an individual act of a government while representation is the collective act of an organ within an international organization. This is because what appears to be the collective act of an organ
at the macrolevel, is actually the result of several individual decisions
at the microlevel by the delegates of states represented within that
organ. The collective act, then, is composed of and determined by
several individual acts. Thus, the connection between individual votes
and the collective decision is real and cannot be ignored.
43. 5 U.N. SCOR, supra note 38, at 20.
44. Summary Record of Meetings of Committee I of the Preparatory Commission,
6th meeting (Doc. PC/GA/16) at 1i.
45. See the Cuban letter to the Secretary-General, 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 3, U.N. Doc. A/1308 (1950); Cuban Draft Resolution. 5 U.N. GAOR,
Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 5, U.N. Doc. A/1308 (1950); United Kingdom Draft Resolution, 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 6, U.N. Doc. A/1308 (1950). For the
United States position in the Credentials Committee, see 29 U.N. GAOR, Annexes
(Agenda Item 3) 2, U.N. Doc. A/9779 (1974).
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The Nationalist Chinese delegate addressed himself to this connection in his scathing and persuasive reply to the Secretary-General's
memorandum. He informed the Secretary-General:
On the technical side, your memorandum asserts that it is
wrong to link the question of representation with the question of recognition by Member States. InternationalLaw has
nothing direct to say for or against this linkage. As practised
[sic] in the League of Nations as well as in the United
Nations, this linkage is the generalrule; the few cases of nonoperation of linkage which your memorandum cited, have
been the exceptions.'
The Chinese representative's opinion is similar to that of Professor
Briggs, who concluded that one of the "real reasons" for refusing the
communist government the right to represent China in the United
Nations was that "it had not been recognized by a majority of United
Nations Members." ' 47 United Nations practice, although not totally
uniform, bears testimony to this linkage between representation and
recognition. The Secretary-General concedes in the opening sentence
of his memorandum, that "[t]he primary difficulty is that this question
of representation has been linked up with the question of recognition
by Member States." 4 8
It is understandable that governments have attempted to achieve
some consistency within their foreign policies, which includes their
positions as stated by their representatives to the United Nations.
Examples of such attempts are numerous, but the presentation of one
or two will be sufficient:
As regards China, the representative of Sweden stated that
he was not in a position to approve the credentials issued by
the Formosa Government as Sweden had acknowledged and
maintained diplomatic relations with the Central People's
Government of the People's Republic of China.49
In connection with the same issue, "[t]he representative of Burma
stated that his Government had recognized the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and was therefore unable to
approve the credentials of the representatives of another
government. "50
46. 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-May 1950) 24, U.N. Doc. S/1470 (1950) (emphasis
added).
47. Briggs, supra note 34, at 200, 207.
48. 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-May 1950) 18-19, U.N. Doc. S/1466 (1950).
49. First Report of Credentials Committee, 7 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item
3) U.N. Doc. A/2234 (1952).
50. Id. at 2. The reports of the Credentials Committee are replete with reservations
on the credentials of several delegations on precisely this ground.
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The British are unique in their Jekyll-and-Hyde approach to the
Chinese representation question:
As this Assembly knows, Her Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom recognizes the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China as the Government
of China. Nevertheless, it proposes to support the motion
• . . in which the Assembly is asked to decide not to con-

sider [the Chinese representation] question at the current
session during the current year. 5
Mr. Nutting, to whom the above statement is attributed, apparently
was not disturbed by the fact that the above action helped to perpetuate
the participation of a delegation which his government did not consider
as representing any member state.
The Secretary-General attempted to support his argument concerning recognition and representation by referring to the advisory
opinion of the International Court in the (First)Admissions case, 52 and
by drawing an analogy between criteria for representation and criteria
for membership as expressed in article 4 of the Charter. One author has
expressed skepticism for such an analogy because article 4 "concerns
admission, while representation is concerned with a situation arising
subsequent to admission." 5 3 Perhaps the Secretary-General was illadvised in choosing that particular opinion of the Court, because while
the opinion affirmed that a member state "is not juridically entitled to
make its consent to . . . admission dependent on conditions not

expressly provided by paragraph 1 of [article 4 of the Charter]." 5 4 It
also allowed that "no relevant political factor-that is to say, none
connected with the conditions of admission-is excluded." 55 The
majority in that advisory opinion was slim and was made possible only
by the concurring votes of Judges Alvarez and Azevedo, both of whom
allowed that special circumstances may require the denial of admission to an applicant who otherwise fulfilled the conditions of article
4(1) of the Charter. 56 Moreover, the joint dissenting opinions of Judges
Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair, and Read exposed the
51. 10 U.N. GAOR (516th plen. mtg.) 4, U.N. Doc. A/PV.516 (1955).
52. Advisory Opinion on the Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1947-48]
I.C.J. 57 [hereinafter cited as Admissions Case].
53. HIGGINS, supra note 12, at 153.
54. Admissions Case, supra note 52, at 65. For a thorough discussion of the
question of membership and the Court's opinion, see Gross, Election of States to UN
Membership, 48 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'i. L. 37 (1954).

55. Admissions Case, supra note 52, at 63.
56. Id. at 71, 77-78. The Court's former Registrar, Edvard Hambro, casts similar
doubts on this opinion. See, Hambro The Authority of the Advisory Opinions of the
InternationalCourt of Justice, 3 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 2, 21 (1954). See also Gross, supra
note 54, at 45.
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weakness of the majority opinion when it rejected the "distinction,
which it has been attempted to introduce between the actual vote [on
membership] and the discussion preceding it.

.

.

.

"7

The joint dis-

sent added that "it would be a strange interpretation which gave a
Member freedom to base its vote upon a certain consideration and at
the same time forbade it to invoke that consideration in the discussion
' 58
preceding the vote."
Regarding the practice referred to in the Secretary-General's
memorandum, it should be noted that it is the practice of organs acting
solely on membership applications. The practice referred to deals with
"instances of States for whose admission votes were cast by Members
which had not recognized the candidates as States" 59 and while this is
undoubtedly so, the converse is equally true. Member states have
voted against admitting those states which they have not recognized. 6'
The important issue is that the alleged practice is permissive rather
than mandatory in nature. Member states are not precluded from
voting in favor of membership status concerning an applicant with
whom they have no diplomatic relations or whom they have not yet
recognized. Nothing binds member states to follow such a practice
since mere practice is insufficient to form a legally binding rule. In
order to form a rule, the practice in question must be "of a peaceable,
uniform and undisputed character accepted in fact by all current Mem"
.61
bers. .
It is well settled that for a practice to be legally binding it must not
only be consistent over a sufficient interval of time, but must also be
opinio juris, which is the conviction that the practice in question is
required by law. As Oppenheim has said, "custom must not be
confounded with usage." 62 When voting on admission questions, it is
clear that member states are not averse to vote in favor of an applicant
that they have not yet recognized. Yet, this fact does not indicate that
57.

Admissions Case, supra note 52, at 83.

58.

Id. at 82.

59.

5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-May 1950) 21, U.N. Doc. S/1466 (1950).

60. This was true until 1955. Since then there have not been major struggles over
admissions except with divided states, such as East and West Germany, North and

South Korea, and North and South Vietnam. The Secretary-General's memorandum
held true at the time it was written in 1950.
61. Advisory Opinion On Certain Expenses of the United Nations [1962] I.C.J. 151,
195 (separate opinion of Sir Percy Splender, J.) [hereinafter cited as the Expenses
Opinion].
62. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 22 (2d ed. 1912). In his separate opinion
in the Barcelona Traction case, Judge Ammoun has called it "the psychological element
of opinio juris." Barcelona Traction Case, (1970] I.C.J. 3, 329.
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opinio juris exists. Therefore, the effect of the Secretary-General's
memorandum is to claim that what states are willing to do, they must
do by law.
The Secretary-General's memorandum does have some merit in
that it suggests criteria for deciding representation questions. It proposes that the claimant exercise "effective authority within the territory of the State and [be] habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population."63 Effective control of a state's resources and people by the
governmental authority seeking to represent the state in the United
Nations seem to be essential for the state to fulfill its obligations under
the Charter. Member states assess effective control when voting on
admission because an express criterion for admission is that applicants,
"inthe judgment of the Organization, [be] able and willing to carry
out these obligations.' '6 If effective control is the test by which a
governmental authority is to be judged at the time of admission, one
may inquire as to whether it is reasonable to expect any less from a
governmental authority whose representativeness has been challenged.
B. General Assembly Resolution 396 (V) on "Recognition by
the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State"
The question of Chinese representation first made its impact in the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO).65 The Director-General of UNESCO sent a letter on June
1, 1950, to the United Nations Secretary-General, transmitting the text
of a resolution adopted by the UNESCO General Conference, 66 in
which it was considered
highly desirable [that] in cases where two or more authorities
each claim to be the only regular government of a Member
State, . . . [the] United Nations should lay down guiding
principles which would allow the various organs of the
United Nations and of the specialized agencies, irrespective
of differences in the composition of these bodies to adopt a
uniform policy .... 67
63. 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-May 1950) 23, U.N. Doc. S/1466 (1950).
64. U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1. Although it is states that are admitted to the United
Nations, the effective control of some governmental authority is implied therein. The
decision on the effective control of a governmental authority is telescoped into the
decision to admit a state. The two can be distinct stages, and this is illustrated by the
Congo case, where the Republic of the Congo, Leopoldville, was admitted to the United
Nations on September 20, 1960. G.A. Res. 1480, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 64,
U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). The decision on representation was not taken until November
22, 1960. G.A. Res. 1498 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 1, U.N. Doc. A/4684

(1960).
65. Liang, supra note 35, at 691.
66. 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 3, U.N. Doc. A/1344 (1950).
67. Id.
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The question was independently raised in the United Nations by
the Cuban representative, who in a letter dated July 19, 1950, requested that the Secretary-General place the question concerning recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a member state on
the provisional agenda of the General Assembly.6 8 The Assembly
channeled the item to the Ad Hoc Political Committee. 69 The committee considered the question at eleven meetings, appointed a subcommittee to look into the matter, and finally submitted a report70 that
included a draft resolution to the General Assembly. 7' The General
Assembly adopted the draft resolution as resolution 396 (V), but only
72
after approving an amendment submitted by the Egyptian delegation.
Resolution 396 (V), among other things,
[r]ecommends that, whenever more than one authority
claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member
State in the United Nations and this question becomes the
subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question
should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each
case ....

73

It is arguable that since the resolution addresses itself to a situation where rival claimants exist, it does not apply to a situation such as
exists in South Africa where the credentials of only one authority were
submitted and considered. Then, it could be concluded that resolution
396 (V) applies solely to multiple claimants, leaving the issue of a
sole claimant open to question.
It is suggested that this position is a distinction without a difference. Whatever criteria is used to establish one authority over the
claims of another authority, that same criteria must be used to establish
representation of a state in the Assembly. Therefore, if one of two
claimants fulfills the criteria for representation "in the light of the
Purposes and Principles of the Charter," as envisaged by resolution
396 (V), it is only equitable to expect that all other authorities meet the
same criteria to represent their respective states. Merely because one
68. 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 13, U.N. Doc. A/1578 (1950). The
Cuban letter is found in 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 1, U.N. Doc. A/1292
(1950).
69. 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 13, U.N. Doc. A/1578 (1950).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 15. For the subcommittee's report, see 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda
Item 61) 8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.38/L.45 (1950).
72. 5 U.N. GAOR (325th plen. mtg.) 675, U.N. Doc. A/PV.325 (1950).
73. G.A. Res. 396(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 24-25, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
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governmental authority is challenged by another is no reason to subject
it to more or less stringent criteria than one which does not face such a
challenge.
This is compatible with the possibility that in the case of two rival
authorities, the claims of each may be more diligently examined,
whereas in the case of only one authority claiming to represent a state,
its claim may be examined less diligently. In light of international
law's bias in favor of incumbent regimes, there may be some relaxation of the criteria in such cases. Nevertheless, the legal criteria must
be, apriori, the same in all cases since it is the representativecapacity
of the authority which is in question. Thus, it follows that although
resolution 396 (V) refers expressly to cases in which "more than one
authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member
State in the United Nations," any principle of representativeness that it
embodies should rule in all cases where representation is questioned.
Paragraph 1 of resolution 396(V) recommends that representation
questions "be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of
the Charter and the circumstances of each case." The terms seem
designed to create ambiguity, with the effect of giving free play to the
political interests of member states. However, this result could be
achieved only after more concrete proposals have been rejected. The
Cuban proposal had recommended that representation questions be
decided in the light of 1) effective authority over the national territory,
2) the general consent of the population, 3) ability and willingness to
achieve the purposes of the Charter, to observe its principles, and to
fulfill international obligations of the state, and 4) respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. 74 A British proposal had recommended that "the right of a government to represent the member
state" in the United Nations be recognized if it "exercises effective
control and authority over all or nearly all the national territory, and
has the obedience of the bulk of the population of that territory, in such
a way that this control, authority and obedience appear to be of a
' 75
permanent character. "
The subcommittee which had been appointed by the Ad Hoc
Political Committee recommended that "effective control over the
territory," general acceptance by the population, willingness to accept
Charter responsibilities, and the extent to which the authority in question had been established through "internal processes in the Member
74. 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 5, U.N. Doc. A/1308 (1950).
75. Id. at 6, 8.
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State" be "among the factors to be taken into consideration." 76 Yet,
these recommendations of the subcommittee were excluded by the Ad
Hoc Political Committee when an Egyptian motion to that end was
adopted by a vote of twenty-seven in favor, thirteen against, and
eleven abstentions.17 The Secretary-General's annual report for that
year states:
[V]arious representatives expressed doubts concerning the
advisability of attempting to adopt various criteria that had
been proposed. Some of them held that every case should be
decided on its merits; others declared that the only criterion
universally accepted in international law was that of effective control and authority over the territory of the State
7

concerned .

Apparently, member states were unwilling to curtail not only their
freedom of action, but also the scope of their political judgments, and
adopted resolution 396 (V). This follows when one examines the text
of the resolution and discovers that it does not place restrictions upon
the free judgment of states, but, rather, safeguards it. Members of the
United Nations have already accepted, by the introductory paragraph
of article 2 and by other articles of the Charter such as articles 2 (2) and
4 (1), the obligations, purposes, and principles of the Charter, and are
expected always to bear these in mind. 79 The phrase which requires
that the question be considered "in the light of the Purposes and
Principles of the Charter" advances us no closer to resolving representation questions. Moreover, the clause that refers to "the circumstances of each case" sets the foundation in which member states are
literally unfettered in exercising their political judgments on the ques80
tion of representation.
It should be noted that even if the text of resolution 396 (V) had
contained express criteria, it would not have changed matters significantly. Such criteria would only aid member states in making the legal
constatations, but would not bind the states to the further step of acting
upon the basis of such constatations. An interpretation similar to that
76. 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 9, U.N. Doc. A/AC.38/L.45 (1950).
77. 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 15, U.N. Doc. A/1578, (1950).
78. Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 6
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 70, U.N. Doc. A/1844 (1951). See also 5 U.N. GAOR,
Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.38/L.45 (1950).
79. It is entirely possible that member states do become somewhat absentminded
regarding the purposes and principles of the Charter, and that resolution 396(V), like so
many other reiterative resolutions of the United Nations, was designed to serve a mindjogging purpose, rather than boldly propose new principles or critera.
80. The British delegate echoed this sentiment in reference to the subcommittee
draft, which did offer some criteria. See 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 61) 12,
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adopted by the International Court of Justice in the (First)Admissions
case, where "no relevant political factor" was excluded, would have
8
to be extended to the resolution. '
C. Statement by the United Nations Legal Counsel on the "Scope of
'Credentials' in Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedureof
the General Assembly"
The statement pertaining to rule 27 was submitted to the President
of the General Assembly and conforms to traditional bounds. It asserts
that "[u]nlike the acceptance of credentials in bilateral relations, the
question of recognition of a Government of a Member-State is not
involved .
",82 This argument has been examined at length in
connection with our consideration of Secretary-General Trygve Lie's
memorandum on representation. 83
The Legal Counsel continued to follow tradition by distinguishing
between cases where rival claimants do exist and where they do not
exist. 84 This article has suggested that such a distinction is superficial
and that upon further analysis, one cannot escape the fact that each
delegation seated in the Assembly should satisfy the same criteria,
regardless of the number of claimants involved.85 This position is
borne out by the Legal Counsel's argument:
Should the General Assembly, where there is no question of
rival claimants, reject credentials satisfying the requirements
of rule 27 for the purpose of excluding a Member State from
participation in its meetings, this would have the effect of
suspending a Member State. . . in a manner not foreseen by
the Charter.86
Such a "suspension", according to the Legal Counsel, would be
contrary to the Charter. 7 Is the implication, then, that where there are
rival claimants, the General Assembly can reject "credentials satisfying the requirements of rule 27" without incurring the same fatal
conflict with the Charter?88 This article assumes the answer to be in the
U.N. Doc. A/AC.38/L.45 (1950) It may be added that member states remain obligated to
abide by Charter principles of "good faith" (U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2) and "friendly
relations" (U.N. Charter art. I, para. 2).
81. Admissions Case, supra note 52, at 17.
82. 25 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 3) 3, U.N. Doc. A/8160 (1970).
83. See text accompanying notes 43-52 supra.
84. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
85. 25 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 3) 3, U.N. Doc. A/8160 (1970).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4.
88. The General Assembly's official records do not inform us of the precise
question asked of the Legal Counsel. All that can be found is the Greek delegation's
statement that it would like to have the Legal Counsel's opinion regarding the object of

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977

19

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 [1977], Art. 10
CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 7

negative. What, then, is the point of adding the caveat "where there is
no question of rival claimants" if it is not meant to be an enumerative
or exclusive type of statement? The distinction between single-claimant and multiclaimant cases thus dissolves under the force of the Legal
Counsel's logic.
The invocation of the Charter and its suspension clause under
article 5 is also incorrect for use in representation and credentials
cases. Suspension under the Charter is an action taken against a state
"against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the
Security Council" 8 9 The General Assembly's "powers of decision"
under article 5 "are specifically related to preventive or enforcement
measures," according to the Court in its Expenses opinion. 90 Presumably, such preventive or enforcement measures would be applied
toward the goal contained in article 1(1) of the Charter, which is to
maintain international peace and security. Yet, questions of credentials
and representation are distinct from questions of maintenance of international peace and security. The former deal primarily with the composition of the organs of the United Nations and have no relation to the
latter.
Rights of membership are inherent in the member state and not in
any particular representative or government. Even after the credentials
of a representative have been rejected or after the "representativeness" of a government has been denied, the state's position vis-6ivis its rights remains unaffected. Consider the chain of legal connection9 1 which starts with the state and goes through the government to
the delegate. Within this chain, suspension is an action taken against
the first subject, which is the state-the true international person.
Questions of representation and credentials do not reach that far up the
chain, but merely deal with governments and representatives.
The General Assembly's Rules of Procedure provide for a cessathe discussion of a proposal to reject South African credentials. 25 U.N. GAOR (1900th
plen. mtg.) I1,U.N. Doc. AIPV.1900 (1970). The President of the Assembly, Edvard
Hambro, replied, "in anticipation of such a question, a legal opinion has in fact been
prepared by the Legal Counsel.
...Id.
89. U.N. Charter art. 5.
90. Expenses Opinion, supra note 61, at 163-64. See, Abbott, Augusti, Brown, and
Rode, The General Assembly 29th Session: The Decredentialization of South Africa, 16
HARV. INT'L L. J. 576 (1975), where it is argued that the Assembly's power to exclude a
delegation whose credentials have been rejected, "while not clearly authorized by
Article 21 of the Charter[,] . . .has long been recognized." They add, however, that
despite President Bouteflika's attempt to differentiate between the effect of his ruling
and suspension under article 5 of the Charter, "there is little doubt that his ruling...
conflicts with a literal reading of that Article." d.
91. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
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tion of participation by those persons whose credentials have been
rejected. The Legal Counsel argues that as of 1970, there had not been
any instance "where the representatives were precluded from participation in the meetings of the General Assembly."92 That may be the
case, but it proves little because rule 29 states:
Any representative to whose admission a Member has made
objection shall be seated provisionally with the same rights
as other representatives until the CredentialsCommittee has
reported and the General Assembly has given its decision .9
The above rule indicates that a representative exercises the rights
of membership vested in his state until such time as any objections to
his seating are ruled upon. There is nothing in the rule to suggest that
all objections will be disposed of solely in a manner favorable to the
participation of that individual. It is likely that some objection to a
certain individual would be sustained. If this were not the case, there
would be no reason to seat that person "provisionally". If the objection is sustained by the Assembly, the individual must be deemed to
have lost the exercise of his rights pertaining to his state; his rights
merely were provisional, pending the final decision of the Assembly.
The eviction of such a person has no bearing on any suspension of the
94
member state as envisaged in article 5 of the Charter.
This rule is based on logic, because the manner in which the
General Assembly recognizes an individual as possessing the capacity
to represent his state is by accepting his credentials. Otherwise that
individual lacks legal standing to speak for his state. Inserted in
between the state, which is the member of the United Nations, and the
representative, who exercises the rights of membership, is the governmental authority which supplies the link between the two. It is this
link, the governmental authority, that is challenged when representation questions are raised. Such questions must be distinguished from
those in which "preventive or enforcement action has been taken by
the Security Council" because both pertain to states. Yet, in one case,
one looks into the legitimacy of the government, while in the other
case, one looks into the fulfillment by the government of its international obligations, particularly those under the Charter.
92. 25 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 3) 3, U.N. Doc. A/8160 (1970).
93. Rules of Procedure, supra note 3, at 7 (emphasis added).
94. A parallel situation occurred in the Security Council when the right of the
monarchist Iraqi delegate to participate after the 1958 coupe was challenged. 13 U.N.
SCOR (827th mtg.) 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.827 (1958).
95. Mugerwa, supra note 11, at 283-84.
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CONCLUSIONS

It is clear that recognition, representation, and credentials are
distinct legal concepts. It should also be clear that credentials are
premised on representation.
Using Secretary-General Trygve Lie's memorandum as a starting
point, we have seen that the recognition accorded to states and governments in the United Nations is linked to representation in the General
Assembly. Furthermore, it has been suggested that nothing in law
forbids such a linkage. Indeed, as Mugerwa has said,
The discussions which took place in the General Assembly,
and the action taken by it, reveal the reluctance of the
majority of members to renounce the prerogative of recognition as determining their position on representation.95
General Assembly Resolution 396 (V), the discussions that preceded it, and the Secretary General's memorandum indicate that "effective control" is a possible criterion on which to base constatations
on representation. This criterion is one in which there could be general
agreement. However, the reverse of that proposition could form the
content of a rule that authorities not exercising "effective control"
could not be considered as representing the state in question. In any
case, such determinations settle eligibility questions, which is the first
step of a two-step process that also requires a political decision which
completes the process. Professor Briggs has argued:
The equities in balance are the right of a Member State under
international law to determine who is authorized to represent
it abroad and the right of the United Nations organs under
the Charter to control representation in their respective organs. 96
It must be emphasized that at admission this balance between the
member state and the United Nations is clearly on the side of the
political organs which must judge, among other things, whether applicant states "are able and willing to carry out" their obligations under
the Charter. 97 Although international law gives the benefit of doubt to
incumbent governments, it is submitted that admission to the United
Nations cannot be construed as conferring perpetual representation on
any particular government. Thus, when questions of representation
96. Briggs, supra note 34, at 195.

97. U.N. Charter art. 4, para. I. On this point, see Lachs, Recognition and Modem
Methods of International Cooperation, 35 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 255 (1959).
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arise, the General Assembly must deal with these despite the silence on
the matter within the Charter and the Rules of Procedure. The Assembly cannot ignore the question.
It has been suggested that in voting on such questions, member
states enjoy the prerogative of exercising their political judgment.
Certainly, the conditions required for representation are no more strict
than those for admission of the state, or no more lax than those that
determine the acceptability of delegates and their credentials. Logically, the conditions required for representation fit somewhere between
these two positions because representation itself provides the link
between statehood and the participating delegations. In light of the
present state of the law in this area, one may surmise that if authorities
lack "effective control", they are ineligible to represent a state.
Beyond that, the law of representation in international organizations is
conspicuous only by its absence.
When applying these considerations to the case of South Africa,
we find that the General Assembly must examine and decide the
question of representation when it is raised in that organ. We also find
that although the existing constitutional framework lacks specific legal
criteria in this area, it allows free play to political considerations.
Viewed in these terms, it is clear that, although the South African
government undoubtedly is in "effective control", such determination
would not decide the representation question. Member states still
would have to act on their constatations. In the case of South Africa,
member states decided not to allow the authority in "effective control" to represent the member state in the General Assembly. Yet, it
could be that they did not use "effective control" as the eligibility
condition, but used some other criterion, such as their abhorrence of
apartheid. 9" Because the existing constitutional framework does not
prescribe legal rules and allows member states wide political discretion
on the matter, the decision on South Africa was legal. However, it
ought to be emphasized that it is the legal "gap" and the consequent
political latitude that made such a decision possible. In the Chinese
representation case and in the South African case, many argued that
such gaps are prone to abuse by member states. The cases serve to
illustrate the crying need for settled rules in this sensitive area dealing
98. Paragraph I I of resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of the General Assembly declares
that "the South African regime has no right to represent the people of South Africa and
that the liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity are the
authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people." 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 33, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). See also G.A. Res. 31/6 (1)
(Nov. 9, 1976), 13 U.N. CHRONICLE 77, 79 (Dec. 1976).
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with the relationships between states and international organizations.
The establishment of rules is particularly pressing if governments are
to have any assurance that their representative capacity will not be
challenged each time they are involved in an international dispute or
run afoul of their neighbors.
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